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ABSTRACT
Objectives To estimate the potential economic impact of
pandemic influenza, associated behavioural responses,
school closures, and vaccination on the United Kingdom.
DesignAcomputablegeneralequilibriummodeloftheUK
economy was specified for various combinations of
mortalityandmorbidityfrompandemicinfluenza,vaccine
efficacy, school closures, and prophylactic absenteeism
using published data.
Setting The 2004 UK economy (the most up to date
available with suitable economic data).
Main outcome measures The economic impact of various
scenarios with different pandemic severity, vaccination,
school closure, and prophylactic absenteeism specified
in terms of gross domestic product, output from different
economic sectors, and equivalent variation.
ResultsThecostsrelatedtoillnessalonerangedbetween
0.5% and 1.0% of gross domestic product (£8.4bn to
£16.8bn) for low fatality scenarios, 3.3% and 4.3%
(£55.5bn to £72.3bn) for high fatality scenarios, and
larger still for an extreme pandemic. School closure
increases the economic impact, particularly for mild
pandemics. If widespread behavioural change takes
place and there is large scale prophylactic absence from
work, the economic impact would be notably increased
withfewhealthbenefits.Vaccinationwithapre-pandemic
vaccine could save 0.13% to 2.3% of gross domestic
product (£2.2bn to £38.6bn); a single dose of a matched
vaccine could save 0.3% to 4.3% (£5.0bn to £72.3bn);
and two doses of a matched vaccine could limit the
overall economic impact to about 1% of gross domestic
product for all disease scenarios.
Conclusion Balancing school closure against “business
as usual” and obtaining sufficient stocks of effective
vaccine are more important factors in determining the
economic impact of an influenza pandemic than is the
disease itself. Prophylactic absence from work in
response to fear of infection can add considerably to the
economic impact.
INTRODUCTION
In the past century there were three major influenza
pandemics (1918, 1957, and 1968-9).
1 This century
has seen an outbreak of severe acute respiratory
syndrome (2003), H1N1 subtype of the influenza A
virus (2009), and sporadic outbreaks of H5N1 influ-
enza subtype.
2 In addition to the direct health impacts
of a serious outbreak, we should be concerned about
the economic impact; especially at a time of global
recession.
3 Preparedness planning for a pandemic
must therefore balance two key policy strands—main-
taining “business as usual” to minimise the economic
impact of a pandemic, and encouraging “social distan-
cing” to minimise the health related impact of a
pandemic
4—as well as using resources such as anti-
virals and vaccinations.
This paper considers the tension inherent in these
two policy strands. It provides evidence of the econ-
omy-wide impact of each approach, as well as the
impact that vaccine development may have in recon-
ciling the two objectives of minimising both the health
and economic effects of a pandemic. A key considera-
tion in this analysis is the role of public perceptionand
confidence, expressed by “prophylactic absenteeism,”
where healthy people avoid social contact, including
going to work. This response is likely to emerge at
higher case fatality rates and to be moderated by the
availability of effective vaccines (the current strain of
H1N1 influenza seems to be highly infectious but not
verydeadly,andthismayexplainitslimitedeconomic
impact to date).
METHODS
The analysis is based on a computable general equili-
brium model of the UK
5 over one year. The economy
isspecifiedintermsofseveralagents,includinghouse-
holds, producers, and government, and based on data
(intheformofasocialaccountingmatrix,whichrepre-
sents income and expenditure in the economy by sec-
tor) for 2004 taken from the Global Trade Analysis
Database
6 and national statistics.
78 Computable gen-
eral equilibrium modelling is described in further
detail by Dervis et al.
9
The economic impact of influenza in our model is
assumed to occur through the labour supply, since ill-
ness and death cause both a reduction in the availabil-
ity of labour and in its quality. Mitigation actions can
also affect the labour supply by (a) reducing labour
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avoidinfectionor(b)byincreasinglaboursupplycom-
paredwithnon-mitigatedpandemicscenariosbyredu-
cing the number of infections and deaths
10 and
reducing the extent to which people feel the need to
engage in prophylactic absenteeism.
Pandemic impact
Pandemic planning documents
41112anticipate clinical
attackratesbetween25%and35%,withamaximumof
50%.Wethereforeusethesethreevaluesinourdisease
scenarios. Based on previous pandemics, predicted
case fatality rates for the UK range from 0.2% to
2.5%,
41213 and the summary estimate for European
pandemic preparedness plans is 0.37%.
11 We used
0.4% as our base disease scenario and 2.5% for our
severe scenario, with an extreme scenario of 10%
based on severe acute respiratory syndrome
(SARS).
1314Wethereforehaveninepossiblecombina-
tions of clinical attack rate and case fatality rate.
While deaths permanently remove labour from the
workforce, absenteeism represents temporary
removal. Illness absence will result in subsequent
immunitytothe virus,whereasthose undertaking pro-
phylactic absenteeism will still be vulnerable to infec-
tion. The Commission of the European Communities
suggeststhatthedurationofpandemicinfluenzaillness
isfivetoeightworkingdays,
11andabsenceforseasonal
flu is approximately five days.
15 We therefore assume
fivedaysofillnessforourmildscenario,sevendaysfor
severe, and 22 days for the extreme scenario, which is
based on hospitalisation rates for SARS.
1617 All
absences are estimated as a percentage of time lost
from a working year of 220 days.
Pandemic mitigation: vaccination
Although the US recently announcedthat it expects to
go from vaccine trial to mass vaccination within two
months,
18 and the UK has signed agreements (with
GSKandBaxter)topurchase132milliondosesofpan-
demic-specific vaccine,
19 specific vaccines are unlikely
to be available for the first wave of infection.
20 During
this stage, pre-pandemic vaccines, based on existing
virusstrains,willbetheonlyoptionforprotection,giv-
ing approximately 20% efficacy and, when combined
withotherclinicalcountermeasures,reducingthe pan-
demic’s impact to that of seasonal influenza.
21 Once
matched vaccines become available they are likely to
have 70-80% efficacy, probably requiring two doses at
an interval of three weeks. Vaccine shelf life is cur-
rently about one year.
22
We assumed two vaccination strategies—a pre-pan-
demic vaccine with 20% efficacy and a matched vac-
cine with 40% efficacy (single dose) and 80% efficacy
(double dose).
23 For all vaccines we assumed sufficient
stocks for 60% coverage. Vaccination would have two
potentialimpactsonapandemic,reducingthenumber
of infected individuals and moderating the extent of
prophylactic absenteeism because people feel pro-
tected from infection.
Pandemic mitigation: school closure
School closures are believed to reduce the impact of
thepandemic,sinceinfectionratesamongchildrenare
high,
4 and this is mentioned in many pandemic plan-
ning documents.
1224-26 Although we witnessed closure
at the early stages of the H1N1 influenza pandemic, it
has been suggested that closure later, when the epi-
demic is better established, will be more effective in
delaying spread, but also inevitable if large sectors of
the population adopt prophylactic absenteeism in the
face of increasing reports of deaths.
27 It is therefore
important to distinguish between school closure as a
reactive policy to a pandemic and school closure asso-
ciated with prophylactic absenteeism.
Ferguson et al
10 suggest that reactive school closure
will result in closure for 95% of the 15 weeks of the
pandemic, regardless of how often they reopen (dura-
tion of school closure associated with prophylactic
absenteeism cannot, of course, be known). Previous
studies
2829 have assumed school closure at the four
week peak of the pandemic, allowing for some varia-
tionaroundthetwoorthreeweekdiseasepeakcitedin
the Department of Health’s pandemic plan.
4 Any
schoolclosurepolicywillresultindisruptionforwork-
ingparentsand,basedonpeakpandemicdurationand
Ferguson’s estimates, we present scenarios with four
weeksand14.25weeksofschoolclosure.Wealsocon-
sider the mitigation impact of school closure, which is
estimated as 2% for a 34% clinical attack rate in the
Ferguson paper and up to a maximum of between
Glossary of terms
Computable general equilibrium model— —A mathematical model of the whole economy
that includes the cost minimising and profit maximising behaviour of producers, the
consumptionandsavingbehaviourofhouseholdsandgovernment,taxationmechanisms,
and the use of labour, capital, and other factors in order to produce goods for investment
or consumption. The model produces a benchmark solution which is then compared with
alternative solutions incorporating policy change or other events simulated by the model.
Counterfactual solutions can be compared with the benchmark solution to estimate the
economic impact of the simulated policy or event.
Social accounting matrix— —A matrix that represents the balanced income and expenditure
flows of a regional, national, or global economy aggregated to make them a manageable
size for use in a computable general equilibrium model. (The matrix rows represent
income to the economy and the columns represent expenditure.)
Global trade model— —A computable general equilibrium model of the global economy.
Prophylactic absenteeism— —Absence from work of a healthy individual in order to avoid
infection.
Clinical attack rate— —The percentage of individuals in a population who become infected.
Case fatality rate— —The percentage of infected individuals who die.
Mortality rate— —Percentage of individuals in a total population whodie (clinical attack rate
× case fatality rate).
Reactive school closure— —Government closure of a school to reduce infection when a
(government defined) proportion of children or staff is experiencing illness.
School closure associated with prophylactic absenteeism— —Closure of schools caused by
the amount of prophylactic absence by staff.
Transition point— —The point at which the severity of the pandemic provokes sufficient fear
to invoke a sudden increase in prophylactic absenteeism within the population.
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30which
we approximate as 15%.
The UK Labour Force Survey (2005) suggests that
25245000 individuals aged 16-64 are in paid employ-
ment,ofwhom3900000arewomenwhohavedepen-
dent children in the household. That is, 15.5% of the
workforce comprises women who are probably
responsible for dependent children.
31 A small propor-
tion of working men is also reported to be responsible
for dependent children,
32 bringing potential absentee-
ism estimates through school closure to 16.1%. How-
ever, we made some attempt to correct this estimate to
account for informal care by grandparents, working
from home, etc. In addition, we assumed that those
54% of working parents who maintain working hours
during school closure because of informal care
32 will
lose working hours equivalent to one person’s illness
duration when their informal caregiver is ill.
Pandemic mitigation: prophylactic absenteeism
Previousstudies
282933haveshownthatamaindriverof
economic impact is behavioural change. Behavioural
change can include changes in consumption patterns
and prophylactic absence from work to avoid infec-
tion. Prophylactic absence from work is likely to be
governed by personal choice related to fear and there-
fore is unlikely to be proportionate. There will be a
transition point when the number of individuals who
decidetotakerelativelydrasticsocialdistancingaction
to avoid infection increases rapidly over a short space
of time.
We suggest that the transition point in public beha-
viour related to an influenza pandemic is likely to be
heavily influenced by the case fatality rate but to be
reasonably independent of the clinical attack rate
sinceillness,byitself,causeslimitedfearif a fullrecov-
ery is anticipated. The public response to the current
H1N1 pandemic supports this.
The level of the case fatality rate at which such a
transition point will occur is likely to be related to the
densityofdeathsin“effectivesocialnetworks”—thatis,
the prospect of death becomes rapidly personalised
with the death of a member of one’s network of rela-
tives, friends, colleagues, and acquaintances. To our
knowledge,nostudyhasbeenconductedtodetermine
the impact of prophylactic absenteeism on modelling
predictions related to disease and economic impacts.
Accurate estimation of this transition point for pan-
demic influenza would require extensive survey
work, and it would be useful to undertake such
researchinfuturesoastobuildupabodyofknowledge
relevant to the kind of modelling reported here. In its
absence we have selected the conservative value of
about 300 people as the effective social network, to
include close contacts such as family and friends (10-
12 people), acquaintances, and work colleagues.
34-38
On this basis almost everybody in the population will
know someone who has died once the mortality rate
reaches one death per 300 people, triggering prophy-
lactic absenteeism.
Simplearithmeticsuggeststhatthereare200000dis-
crete effective social networks in the UK (60000000/
300). However, many of these will overlap, and so the
real figure for the number of discrete social networks
involved in communication of news of a death, taking
into account Facebook, texting, and other networking
tools, is likely to be smaller. In the absence of research
on this topic, a case fatality rate in the range 2.5-5%
seemsto be a valid assumptionfor the expected transi-
tion point.
Not all individuals will avoid work during a pan-
demic, but a survey conducted after the SARS
outbreak
31 indicated that about 34% of the working
populationinEuropewouldbewillingtotakeprophy-
lactic absence from work in the event of an infectious
disease outbreak. Although survey responses do not
always reflect true behavioural responses, it is reason-
able to assume that the 34% of respondents who
reported themselves as willing, in theory, to avoid
workfora seriouspandemic,would dosoat the transi-
tion point presented above.
Itisdifficulttopredictthedurationofsuchabsentee-
ism, as high levels of fear might cause prolonged peri-
odsofabsencebysome.However,itmightreasonably
be assumed that in most cases, absentees would be
forced to take annual leave (as longer term sick leave
usually requires a doctor’s authorisation). On this
assumption, absenteeism is likely to last up to four
weeks, and, since the peak of the pandemic is likely to
lasttwoorthreeweeks
4andthe transitionpointisunli-
kely to be reached before the peak, this is presumed to
be a reasonable upper limit.
Table 1 provides a summary of the assumed para-
meter estimates used in our disease scenarios together
with the sources of these estimates.
RESULTS
Model of economic impact of pandemic influenza
Theaccuracy of these resultsis subjectto the scenarios
wehaveoutlined,themodelspecification,andtheeco-
nomic data from 2004 underlying the model. Figure 1
showstheimpactofvariousdiseaseandmitigationsce-
narios on gross domestic product: disease only (with
no mitigation), disease with four weeks of school clo-
sure, disease with pre-pandemic vaccine, disease with
matched vaccine (single dose), and disease with
matched vaccine (double dose). Each scenario is
plotted for low, medium, and high clinical attack rate
(25%, 35%, and 50%) and low, high, and extreme case
fatality rates (0.4%, 2.5%, and 10%), although both
rates are adjusted to allow for mitigation effects in the
mitigation scenarios.
Low case fatality rate
Thefirstthreehistogrambarsshowtheimpactofalow
case fatality rate, in which variations in clinical attack
rate have little impact (loss of 0.51-1.02% of gross
domestic product). However, the impact of four
weeks of school closure is large, doubling or even tri-
pling the impact of the disease alone. The results also
show that in a low fatality pandemic a pre-pandemic
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domestic product, and a matched vaccine could result
in savings of 0.26-0.51% for a single dose and 0.49-
0.96% for a double dose. The transition point of pro-
phylactic absenteeism is not reached in any of the sce-
narios with a low case fatality rate.
High case fatality rate
With a high case fatality rate, however, the transition
pointisreached(mortalityratebecomessimilartothat
of the 1918 pandemic), so that individual change in
behaviour to avoid infection yields large impacts of
3.3%, 3.7%, and 4.3% of gross domestic product for
the low, medium, and high infection rates, respec-
tively—emphasising that the mortality rate can, in
such circumstances, be a more important determinant
of economic impact than the infection rate.
The introduction of school closures in high fatality
scenarios has less impact than in low fatality scenarios,
with an additional impact of 0.75-0.8% of gross domes-
tic product. A pre-pandemic vaccine would be insuffi-
cient to avoid the transition point in a high fatality
pandemic and so would reduce the impact on gross
domestic product by only 0.33-0.64%. A matched vac-
cine, even if only single dose, would have sufficient
effect to avoid the transition point and could therefore
result in savings of 2.6-3.2% of gross domestic product
(roughlyequivalenttohalfoftheimpactofthefinancial
crisis over the past year (www.statistics.gov.uk/instantfi
gures.asp)).Twodosesofamatchedvaccinearelikelyto
reduce the impact further, yielding savings of 3-4%.
Extreme case fatality rate
The extreme fatality scenariospredictably yieldthe lar-
gest impacts. Our assumptions dictate that for such a
serious pandemic the transition point would be passed,
andthelow,medium,andhighinfectionscenariosyield
reductionsingrossdomesticproductof6.0%,7.4%,and
9.6%, respectively.Schoolclosure increases thisimpact
by 0.63-0.77%, which is smaller than for the less severe
scenarios as the mitigation impact of school closure
reduces the severity of the disease. Pre-pandemic vac-
cine has some effect on reducing the impact of the
Table 1 |Parameter assumptions and their sources used to estimate effects of pandemic influenza and possible responses to it
Parameter Estimates Evidence
Clinical attack rate 25% (mild); 35% (moderate); 50% (high) Department of Health (2007)
4; Commission of the European Communities (2005)
11;
Health Protection Agency (2006)
12
Case fatality rate 0.4% (low); 2.5% (high); 10% (extreme) Department of Health (2008)
13; Stadler et al (2003)
14
Duration of illness (working days) 5 (low); 7 (high); 22 (extreme) Commission of the European Communities (2005)
11; Postma et al (2005)
15;P e i r i se ta l
(2003)
16;M c L e a ne ta l( 2 0 0 5 )
17
No of working days per year 220 Assumes 104 days are weekends, 8 days are bank holidays, and 33 days of annual
leave or other absence
Pre-pandemic vaccine efficacy 20% Department of Health (2007)
21
Matched vaccine efficacy 40% (single dose); 80% (double dose) Leroux-Roels et al (2008)
23
School closure duration
4 weeks Based on duration of peak of pandemic, Department of Health (2007)
4
14.25 weeks (95% of 15 week duration) 15 weeks based on duration of pandemic, Department of Health (2007)
4;9 5 %o f
duration based on Ferguson et al (2006)
10
Percentage of parents needing to take time
off work if schools were closed
16.1% Sadique et al (2008)
33
Percentage of parents with access
to informal care
54% Sadique et al (2008)
33
Density of effective social networks 300 people Cheng et al (2004)
34; Chombart de Lauwe et al (1953)
35;K oe ta l( 2 0 0 6 )
36
Percentage of population willing to take
prophylactic absence at the transition point
34% Sadique et al (2007)
31
Duration of prophylactic absence 4 weeks Based on limitations of annual leave and duration of peak pandemic, Department of
Health (2007)
4
Transition point when prophylactic absence
becomes widespread
When ≥1 death occurs in every social network* See density of effective social networks
Mitigation impact of school closures
Reductioninclinicalattackrateequivalentto2%in
a pandemic with 34% clinical attack rate
Ferguson et al (2006)
10
15% reduction in CAR Cauchemez et al (2009)
30
*When mortality rate (clinical attack rate × case fatality rate) is ≥1/300.
Pandemic characteristics
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Fig 1 | Effect of pandemic influenza on UK gross domestic
product (GDP) according to various disease and mitigation
scenarios (all vaccination strategies assumed to have 60%
coverage)
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of matched vaccine yields slightly larger savings of 2.2-
4.3%. The matched vaccine with two doses is the only
mitigationstrategy that avoidsthe transition toprophy-
lactic absenteeism in the extreme fatality scenarios,
reducing the overall impact of the pandemic to 1.1-
1.2% of gross domestic product (much less than the
impact of the current financial crisis).
Alternative scenarios
Alternatives to these scenarios have also been mod-
elled but are not reported in detail here. In brief,
schools closing for about 95% of the 15 weeks of the
pandemic’s duration and assuming a mitigation
equivalent to 2% if the clinical attack rate was 34%, as
outlined by Ferguson et al,
10 produces a 2.5% further
reduction in gross domestic product compared with
our four week closure scenarios; it reduces the infec-
tion rates, but the dominance of the case fatality ratein
determiningthetransitionpointissuchthatthedegree
of prophylactic absenteeism remains the same.
Similarly, informal care by grandparents and
friends,reducingthelevelofprophylacticabsenteeism
from 16.1% to 8.7%,
32 reduces the loss to gross domes-
tic product by 0.56-0.58% in the four week school clo-
sure scenarios and by 1.8-2.0% in the longer closure
scenario. Assuming the higher mitigation rate of 15%
suggested by Cauchemezet al,
30 which would apply to
longerschoolclosurescenarios,theseverityoftheeco-
nomic impact of school closures is reduced in propor-
tion to the severity of the pandemic. This reduction is
quitesmall—upto0.25%ofgrossdomesticproductfor
non-extremescenariosand upto0.9%of grossdomes-
tic product in the most extreme and unmitigated sce-
nario—sooverallreductionsingrossdomesticproduct
are still between 1% and 2% larger than with the four
weekschoolclosurescenarios.Schoolclosure’sfailure
to mitigate the impact of the disease despite the
assumption of its efficacy is due to the large amount
of absenteeism induced by school closures, which, in
our model, is not affected by the clinical attack rate.
Additional scenarios relating to the swine flu pan-
demic and alternative vaccine efficacy assumptions
are included in an online appendix.
Impact of pandemic on different economic sectors
Figure 2 shows the impact on different sectors of the
economy for the 35% clinical attack rate and 0.4%
case fatality rate scenario. The pattern is similar across
scenarios.Thelowestimpactsareseenintheextraction
sector (mining, quarrying, forestry and fishing) fol-
lowed by crops, utilities, and health and non-health
services. The largest impacts are in the meat and live-
stock, processed foods, textiles/paper/plastics, manu-
facturing, and transport and communications sectors.
Equivalent variation
Computable general equilibrium modelling also pro-
duces the welfare measure of equivalent variation,
which represents the amount of money that, if an eco-
nomic change does not happen, leaves the population
just as well off as if the change had occurred. This may
be thought of as the amount of money that the popula-
tion mightbewilling topay toavert the pandemic.For
the purposes of this paper, the welfare measure is
quoted as a percentage of gross domestic product,
with the results presented in table 2. In order to
avoid the economic impact of the pandemic, the cost
thatthepopulationmightbewillingtopayrangesfrom
0.7%(£11.8bn)forthemildestdisease-onlyscenarioto
14% (£235bn) for the most extreme. School closure
increases these values to 5.1% (£85.8bn) in the mildest
scenario to 17.9% (£301.1bn) for the most severe sce-
nario.
DISCUSSION
Our results show that, depending on the disease sever-
ity, pandemic influenza alone could reduce gross
domestic product by 0.5-4.3%. Extending fatality
rates beyond those observed in previous pandemics
toaSARS-likecasefatalityrateof10%yieldsanimpact
of 5.9-9.6% of gross domestic product (£99.2bn to
£161.5bn).Schoolclosure,anditsrelatedabsenteeism,
causesanotableincreaseineconomicloss,andcaution
Sectors of GDP
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Fig 2 | Impact of pandemic influenza on different economic
sectors of UK gross domestic product (GDP)
Table 2 |Equivalent variation as percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) and £bn for
different influenza pandemic scenarios
Pandemic scenario Disease only 4 week school closure
Case fatality rate Clinical attack rate % of GDP £bn % of GDP £bn
Low
Low −0.7 −11.8 −5.1 −85.8
Medium −1 −16.8 −5.4 −90.8
High −1.5 −25.2 −5.8 −97.6
High
Low −4.8 −80.7 −8.8 −148.0
Medium −5.4 −90.8 −9.4 −158.1
High −6.3 −106.0 −10.3 −173.2
Extreme
Low −8.7 −146.3 −12.7 −213.6
Medium −10.8 −181.7 −14.8 −248.9
High −14 −235.5 −17.9 −301.1
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when the case fatality rate is low.
Apre-pandemicvaccinewithmoderateefficacyand
60% coverage could result in large relative savings for
any low or high fatality pandemic of £2.2bn-£10.8bn,
or £20.2bn-£39.0bn for extreme scenarios. A matched
vaccine, even if only available in sufficient time for a
single dose to be administered to 60% of the popula-
tion, would result in substantially higher savings, in
both low and high fatality scenarios, and a double
dose of a matched vaccine could keep the loss in
gross domestic product to below 3%, even with the
most extreme pandemic and long school closures—
which is little more than half the impact of the current
recession, although recovery from a severe flu event
would probably be much more rapid. Estimates sug-
gest that the planned H1N1 flu vaccination will cost
about £6 per person (www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=20601124&sid=auYQiQYJ.73I), yielding
a total cost of about £792m, compared with savings
that start from £2.2bn for the mildest pandemic. Our
resultssuggestthat,eveninamildpandemic,avaccine
costing£16.60perpersonwouldbebeneficialinterms
of its health impact without imposing a burden on the
economy.
Ourresultsalsoconsiderthepossibilitythatthereisa
transitionpointincasefatalityrate,abovewhichmany
individuals might change their usual behaviour and
avoid work in an attempt to avoid infection. Evidence
suggeststhat50%prophylacticabsence,whichislarger
than our assumed absence rates, is likely to reduce a
34% clinical attack rate by only 1% (case fatality rate
is unchanged as this is dependent on the disease).
10
Since these absence rates could cost the economy bil-
lions of pounds, prophylactic absence should be dis-
couraged except in exceptional circumstances.
Limitations and strengths of study
This work does not take into account consumption
effects from avoidance of public places, entertainment
events, and changes in shopping patterns, although
further work is under way to establish an evidence
base from which these effects can be modelled.
Impacts on trade, imports, and exports have not been
examined here as it is difficult to assess these impacts
accurately with a single-country model. A study with a
global trade model is ongoingand will supplement the
findings presented here.
The strength of our findings depends on the under-
lying assumptions which, though based on published
evidence where possible, are subject to the bias of sur-
veys, the unpredictability of the disease and its resul-
tant impact on policies and behavioural change. We
included estimates of school closure and prophylactic
absence, but their true values in the middle of a pan-
demiccouldvarywidely.However,thispaperextends
previouswork
24byusingthebestavailableestimatesto
approximate the impact of social networks on beha-
vioural change, considering various lengths of school
closure, their feedback effects on the pandemic, and
the impact of informal care both in mitigating absen-
teeism due to school closure and in causing absentee-
ismbyparentswheninformalcarersareunwell,aswell
as considering the impact of various vaccination stra-
tegies on disease and behaviour change.
Conclusion
Pandemicinfluenzaitself,ifitoccurswithinthebounds
of severity outlined in pandemic plans, will not yield
unprecedented economic impacts: even a high fatality
pandemic with high levels of infection would reduce
gross domestic product by less than 4.5%. However,
two factors will compound the disease’s impact.
Firstly, a pandemic in the near future would impose
additional strain on an economy that is already
stretchedbyrecession,exaggeratingtheeffectofreces-
sion and slowing economic recovery. Secondly,
although the direct economic impact of disease is rela-
tively small, school closures and prophylactic absen-
teeism, whether imposed by government or the result
of fear of infection in the population, could greatly
increase the economic impact.
In the event of a mild pandemic, long periods of
schoolclosureswill notbenecessaryandcouldgreatly
multiply the economic impact of the disease and
should therefore be minimised. In more serious pan-
demics, the relative economic impact of school clo-
sures decreases and the gains from school closure in
mitigatingthepandemicincrease,soapolicyofschool
closureshouldtakeintoaccounttheseverityofthedis-
ease. However, such a policy should be limited in its
duration—sufficient to maximise the lowering of peak
disease levels and maintain a functioning health ser-
vice, but allowing schools to open at other times. In
an extreme pandemic, the relative incremental cost of
school closure is small and should not influence poli-
cies that would minimise deaths.
Our“transitionpoint”estimatesprovideanexample
of how fear induced behavioural change could greatly
increasetheeconomicimpactofapandemicwhilepro-
viding questionable health gains. We suggest that the
overall mortality rate is the driver of this behavioural
change, and vaccinations, whether pre-pandemic or
matchedvaccine,couldbeextremelyimportantinpre-
venting mortality rates from reaching the “transition
point.” The cost of vaccinations is likely to be less
than the economic savings gained from vaccination,
even in the mildest of pandemics, and in the event of
ahighorextremefatalitypandemicamatchedvaccine
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